Tuesday, December 9, 2008

Pan-European referendum 'impossible,' expert says

"Recently I sat at a table with 20 top constitutional lawyers from different countries asking if a pan-European referendum was possible and the answer was 'no way,' because of all the different constitutional arrangements. It's more complicated than any other solution," Stefano Bartolini from the European University Institute in Florence said at a conference organised by the EU parliament ahead of the 2009 elections.

EU leaders signed the Lisbon treaty in December 2007, but the Irish No put a halt to the project (Photo: Portuguese EU Presidency)

Asked if this was the case with a non-binding referendum as well, he replied that this was the type of plebiscite he referred to, a binding one being "unthinkable."

The chairman of the recently registered Libertas party, Daclan Ganley, who was one of the Irish No-campaigners on the Lisbon treaty, has been advocating a pan-European referendum on the rejected document.

But the idea sparked some virulent remarks from British liberal MEP Andrew Duff.

"I think if you are seeking to destroy a parliament and political parties, then you resort to plebiscite. And you have populism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and racism."

He said he was in favour of holding referendums on "local matters," for instance on building a casino in a town, "but not on constitutional questions."

"It's insulting the intelligence of the people to ask them if they agree with this extraordinarily obscure text they are not going to read or understand. What do we have MPs for? Why do we pay their salaries?" he argued.

Another expert from the European University Institute, Mark Franklin, also said referendums were "extremely dangerous" because they could be misused by "unscrupulous politicians."

Mr Franklin, who studied voter behaviour during the past decades, said people use treaty referendums to express feelings on unconnected EU issues, such as immigration, where they normally have no say.

"It's really hard to control that you will actually get an answer on the specific question you're asking and not on something else," he said.

A Swiss citizen in the audience noted that in her country, people are very well informed when they go to a referendum and answer precisely on the particular matter they are being asked about, however.

Low turnout debates, a 'masochistic exercise'

With turnout in the European elections constantly decreasing in the past decades, debates in the parliament on this phenomenon were "a bit of a masochistic exercise," the legislature's vice-president Alejo Vidal-Quadras told the audience in his opening remarks.

"It seems to be one of the laws of nature now, that every time we have elections, we get fewer voters. We spend more and more money in trying to get people to vote, but in every European election we see the parliament acquiring less power from the ballot box," he said.

While to Mr Vidal-Quadras, the explanations of the low turnout were still a "mystery," in Mr Franklin's view, this phenomenon was easily explained by the fact that EU elections were not "real elections," where voters could influence policy making.

"Voters know perfectly well that they won't have any influence on EU policy making in the European elections, because the ultimate decision maker is the EU Council, not the parliament," Mr Franklin said.

"Give voters some real elections, then they will come to the ballot box."

Rise of fringe parties

The absence of strategic voting in EU elections - voting for big parties because they are likely to get power - should also lead to good scores for extreme parties, both on the right and the left side of the political spectrum, the Italian-based expert added.

To Mr Duff, a strong promoter of the Lisbon treaty, the rise in nationalism and even xenophobia and racism was all because of the rejection of the text.

With big parties reluctant to bring up EU topics such as the Lisbon treaty, since they were usually internally split on the issues, it was up to the "fringe parties" to talk openly about such things in the upcoming election campaign, Mr Duff explained.

This would only put more pressure on mainstream party discipline, which could ultimately fail to "suppress the quarrel about the federalist and nationalist wings," he said.

"It should be a fairly bloody campaign. And at least if it's exciting, it might induce a higher turnout," Mr Duff concluded.

SOURCE

Wednesday, October 15, 2008

Europe as Empire: federalist or neomedieval?

Alex Foti, Max Guareschi

Europe as Empire: federalist or neomedievale?


Herfried Münkler, Imperi. The domination of the world to Rome from the United States, Mulino, pp. 316, € 29.


Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, Oxford University Press, pp. 304, € 24.


Some years ago the library shelves for a time filled with books with titles appeared in the word "empire". Some title: L'empire powerless to Michael Mann, The Empire of the chaos of Alain Joxe, L'empire of fear of Benjamin Barber, The tears empire of Chalmers Johnson. Not missing the variant apologetic, like the Empire of Light Michael Ignatieff. The revival of a term that first decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet colossus then seemed to be relegated to an antique must without doubt the success of global empire of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. But not all. What until then had been the magic word, "globalization", it appeared increasingly spiazzata transition from thrust dell'enlargement Clinton, the Bush administration reaction to 11 September and the theory and practice of the New Century American endorsed by neocon arrived in the room of buttons. " With the renewed activism of the United States military, the bitterness of the policy of returning power of the day.

Herfried Münkler, German political scientist among the most interesting, is known for his studies on the war. His Imperi. The domination of the world from Rome to the United States (the Mulino, pp. 316, euro 29) takes us back to one of the keywords on which, as you said, has focused in recent years the debate on international politics. Unlike the literature to which you refer, however, the volume of Münkler does not bear the idea of empire in terms of termination or simply to describe the aggressive policy of a unit to become the sole superpower status. In his opinion, in fact, empire is not synonymous with "great state".
For Münkler the traits that distinguish two different forms of political organization of space as the empire and the state regarding the borders, relations with neighbors and internal integration. On the first point, it is noted that unlike the state borders, linear and traceable precisely as separate units policies counterparts, the borders of the neighborhood are inevitably and modular, in continuous transformation. The empire, does not relate to other units which recognizes equal rights, hence the impossibility of establishing clear lines of demarcation of its action. As for the empires of the past, the Border Modularity was presented as a sequence of bands there in the presence and capacity for the "center" digradava as we are initiated into suburbs remote and unknown. Entirely in the striatum of our time, a similar morphology appears not to exclude but to overlap. This is a trend anticipated by "spheres of influence" of the Cold War, in which the borders between the various states is an overlapping imperial limes that the focal areas of the planet separated the two camps. And today, steso emerge when we consider the United States, whose state borders, clearly determined not at all coincide with the imperial borders, which mark the different degrees of internal to the emperor, the "home court" to Caribbean countries or NATO Seat, until the entire globe, with the exception of the areas on which insist powers such as China or Russia, manned by a pervasive system of bases.

Unlike the state, which does not tolerate other sovereign within its own ranks, not the empire of tip homogenisation in territories under its authority. Just as empires of the past left them there to other joints policies - for example the many kingdoms included in the Hellenistic Roman construction - the same way in taking our time does not erase the imperial system of states but merely redefined the operation. Nobody thinks that Iraq or Afghanistan are candidates to become the next stars of the U.S. flag on the basis of a process in which the expansion is accompanied integration. Accordingly, within the empire, a partition between the people of the center and those belonging to the nations "federated", a model of differential inclusion in the "province" of membership determines the stock of rights and opportunities which the subject enjoys.

Many others are the elements for analysis that can be drawn from research conducted morphological and comparatively Münkler by, for example regarding the forms taken by the war in the current scenario. Of the purpose is peace, as the literature proclaims encomiastica since the days of Virgil. The war in its classical form, requires the clash between organized political units that recognize each other. Outside of empires, however, there may be only "barbarians", to which we can undertake campaigns or missions punitive peace, not war. Hence the formula that Tacitus connects the mouth to the head of caledonie: "Make the desert and call it peace", that the last decades has had many occasions to return relevant. Another interesting point of the German political scientist regards the push factors that lead to the structuring of empires. Explicit in this regard is the criticism of the various theories of imperialism, economic or political, from Hobson to Lenin, from Schumpeter to Aron, who would share in the individual only "center" the driver for the future of dynamic expansion. Otherwise, Münkler stresses the role of neighborhoods, the central role in determining the processes of imperial definition of the challenges they pose to the center, in terms of instability on the border, empty of power, threatened to consolidated assets.

Münkler inevitably raises the question: but then the EU is an empire? What kind of animal is not identifié quell'object politique, to remember the famous definition of Delors? Delors, perhaps the last chapter of the Commission popular among voters, even in its emblematic cristianosocialismo, not ideology confessed the first fifty years of life of the project and geopolitical geoconomico arose from the ruins of World War II. E 'un empire Europe, to use the term geographical skillfully hegemonic media and elites who used to refer to the hybrid creature with cerebro in Brussels and the body does not know where, animal impossible, for some political chimera, the project opened for many, a limited market and a currency by making the head of the Europeans, for their sake and asking their permission as little as possible? E 'un empire Europe created by well-intentioned technocrats and worse and bankers want business leaders?
Yes, it is an empire, but sui generis. Negri, and Münkler describing some good aspects, one of the suburbs that want to be integrated into the prosperous of the peace to leave the border "barbaric" instability and poverty, the other architecture political and economic domain, showing how governance is now the last refuge of an empty sovereignty, emptied of its non-terzietà in conflict for control of peer production, which opposes the new classes of society in the elite financial network, which controls most means of digital production society, now irretrievably.

Negri, however, and Münkler refer to the Emperor in general and not to Europe and the history of Europe in particular. On this there is relief in the important Jan Zielonka Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, released last year for Oxford. His thesis is simple and strong. The enlargement to the east towards the 12 Baltic countries, Middle European and Balkan has irrevocably changed its nature, transforming it into a sort of Holy Roman Empire of the twenty-first century, with levels of government and sovereignty overlapped, a differential which is the circles concentric borders nuanced (fuzzy borders) and areas of instability on its doorstep (Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, the Caucasus, Turkey, Middle East and Maghreb). It remains not investigated what was the nature of the front enlargement (the EU-15 90s), and especially what the political eurozone today, which disappointed many federalists see as the future Core Europe, which runs ahead of other States on the path of politics. Zielonka not seem to see this case as probable and provides a very realistic portrait of how the mission has changed the European Union and the end of the Cold War, beyond the implicit or explicit drawings that the Commission and had to weave Convention states once placed over the Wall and the Iron Curtain: The New Europe has changed the Old Europe, this is the verdict. It has the largest market business of the world, with its 500 million consumers a high-average income, and has made its borders more porous and undefined in the direction of Russia, the Bosporus, the Caucasus. The New Europe of velvet revolutions wanted by the Old Europe human rights and prosperity: the certainty that the Cold War had ended Actually, that freedom to say, do, travel conquests were irreversible.

The Union has disappointed many of its new members, wait a long time to accept them in 2004-7, but it has certainly increased the standard of living of eurorientali survived the shock therapy of the early 90s. But the political integration of the region east of Elba and Trieste was a first work of NATO, much lest thanks to the direction in the U.S. reap the benefits of the new geopolitical situation determinatasi dall'implosione the other superpower, and only after the Sept. 11, notably a delay coward who has had enormous human costs in the former Yugoslavia. The integration of Central was only after the rich euroccidentali had managed to put the family jewels in a safe, creating the kind of superfrancosvizzero that would have sucked to Frankfurt and Paris the flow of Arab and Asian savings that the first moves towards the City and Wall Street, the price of a common arcimonetarista by statute, the effects of which, however predictable, are there for all to see: cuts in real wages and income polarization, widespread insecurity and exclusion, impoverishment of the middle class. The setting neoliberal (and monetarist) for the economy as modular bridle policy has prevented euroccidentali to see the benefits that a faster integration would have caused to the whole continent, they themselves first. The Anglo-Americans have always pressed for Europe former Soviet entry into the European Union (and now want the same to happen for Turkey), with the intent to dilute the dream Eurofederalist that the elites of various countries held in the drawer: the dream to build a Europe-power, politically and militarily, not only economically integrated, independent of the U.S., and therefore, conversely them, a super vesftaliano, to borrow the terminology of Zielonka, ie a nation state (and federal ) Projecting its imperial domination on the rest of the world.

In truth Eurofederalist that dream had always been the preserve of elite restricted minority even within the three main European policy: Liberals, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats. The double no Franco-Dutch did the bubble burst Eurofederalist, and no Irish even the most modest and intergovernmental Treaty of Lisbon. This shows once again that the emperor is naked European or weak as it was an elective emperor of the third phase of the Holy Roman Empire, the next to the Golden Bull of 1356, which killed the idea of Empire as the sovereign power to the benefit of principalities, were regional, city-states and emerging nation. Even in the EU returns the duality between sovereign powers: on the one hand, the imperial court in Brussels, the other heads of state and government of European nations, in a constant tension between EU powers and prerogatives intergovernmental.

Zielonka proposes a paradigm neomedievale to interpret the nature of sovereignty in 27 states, that questions from the perspective of the internal division of powers (does not meet the centralization and tripartizione typical of the modern state), economic governance (tempered liberalism) , Democracy (or rather lack of it) and the international projection, as power postvestfaliana of civil and administrative (right makes might) between national powers who often resort to military force to defend their interests (might makes right). It is worthwhile here to summarize the elements of the two visions, Eurofederalist (super-Westphalian) and neomedievalista (the secular Franco-German empire) of contemporary Europe.

Europe: neomedieval or federalist?

Empire neomedieval

Westfalian superstate

Borders osmotic evolving

external borders rigidly fixed

uneven socioeconomic

Socio-economic homogeneity

Coexistence different cultural identities

Pan-European cultural identity

intermingling and overlapping of different types of policies

clear hierarchical structure with a central authority

distinction between center and periphery crucial, but open to redefinition continues

absolute and permanent distinction between EU members and non-members EU

citizenship differential with different sets of rights and obligations

United citizenship and exclusive

many police and military institutions that overlap with each other

an army and a European police

divided along lines sovereignty and territorial functional


absolute sovereignty regained


The twentieth century in Europe, after 1991 we can say without a shadow of doubt, was the century of the nation-state and nationalism: the dream of socialist solidarity of class and revolutionary internationalism of the previous century was defeated by the militaristic nationalism and saved from destruction only by twisting nazionalitaria of the Soviet Union and its "anti-Russian empire", from which Mao and Tito will soon head off with very different outcomes: Communist China is still standing thanks all'etnonazionalismo han, while the multi-ethnic and Federal Yugoslavia was plunged into an abyss of blood, opened by savage Milosevic, a socialist cetnico and antialbanese, and Tudjman, Croatia's direct descendant of ustascia Ante Pavelić, the most cruel of statistical phantom Nazi era. The dangerous farce pseudonazionalista of independent Kosovo, recognized by only half the EU countries but blessed by Solana and defended by NATO, which bears a flag that looks like a mix of iconology of the two great protectors, reminds us that there are several fires nationalists (and regionalists ) That still hatch in Europe. When nationalism is mixed with xenophobia and makes indigenous minorities or immigrant their scapegoat, as has happened in the early 90s in the east and is happening in the early'00 to the west, the doors are open to a replica of functional European fascism remains lie below. The alternative to nationalism is aggressive in search of internal and external enemies, in other words fascism. Westphalia, the European system was structured on the basis of religion then national first centuries after 1648, led to colonialism and fascism in Europe. Perhaps Zielonka is right to want to bring to history forever.

The Polish social scientist, however, is unwilling to represent the dark side of the neomedievale, here briefly what we try to do. For example, the "differential citizenship" to see clearly provides guarantees to individuals much less than those offered from the universality of national citizenship as it was developed after the French Revolution. In the Middle Ages, only the nobles, clerics and warriors had full rights. To others, urban artisans, rustic and serf, were recognized only exemptions and obligations. The former could acquire a significant stock of freedom only escape legitimized by the feudal sovereignty, avoiding free to cities and municipalities free, ie those interstices of autonomy allowed by the overlapping of different secular and ecclesiastical authorities. The second had only the right to protection from arbitrary violence of others but not the feudal lord. In short, producers in the Middle Ages were in principle excluded from citizenship. Only urban dwellers were able to assert their rights, at the cost of popular rebellions against the clerical and aristocratic often ended in blood, such as those that shake the Hanseatic League in the thirteenth century, or Liege (municipal democracy) and Florence (the Ciompi ) In the second half of the fourteenth century.

Fast Forward to the twenty-first century. Even in today's society are not large, partially or completely, by nationality. The migrants sans papiers are the first category that comes to mind: migrants are the serf of contemporary Europe. But in general, all immigrants, especially Muslims, are citizens of the third category. The remainder nationalistic, yes medieval, which gives citizenship on the basis of "race" rather than place of birth, means that children and grandchildren of immigrants from Africa, Asia, South America remain in most cases excluded from citizenship. Remove the ius sanguinis (six Italian only son of Italian) for the benefit of ius soli (six Italian if born in Australia) is the fundamental measure for a political strategy of the left that wants to create a true European citizenship: start with giving European passport to anyone born in Europe, no matter if parents "illegal". But well see even precarious and unemployed have full citizenship. The European social market recognizes substantial rights only to those who work. Who does not work or has a job precariousness is a citizen of series B, as devoid of protection offered by intermediate groups such as unions and professional organizations. Moreover, while native salaried employees and enjoy full citizenship, do not feel citizens for all intents and purposes, and it just may vote against the charges and privileges of the European elite. Only the European nobility is now as then truly cosmopolitan. That is to say that elite politicians, bureaucrats, managers, bankers, professionals who have benefited over the past twenty years the pooling of financial and commercial. Those who have seen their real incomes shrink blatantly after the introduction of the euro does not feel citizens of Europe, but their states and their regions. One of the paradoxes of regionalism to Bossi and xenophobic Haider is to be arciostile EU, when it was just to boost economic regions in an attempt to create a fair policy that bypass the cumbersome nation-states and diminished the power of authority National always reluctant to cede power to Brussels and Strasbourg. Until the 90s and younger students represented a constituency secure Europe. Yet in the years'00, despite Erasmus, GSM and low-cost, took a vote massively against the new EU treaties, both in France and Ireland, because Europe has become too elitist, undemocratic gerontocratica and especially in order to heat the young minds. Instead, they stir when he says that if you vote against will be as if nothing had happened.

Finally, the end of the Cold War had opened an area east to the attractiveness of the European post, creating the outskirts desire to join the European Community, and Münkler as theorized in the relationship between cities and suburbs is typical of ' empire as bearer of peace and prosperity, but the return of war and geopolitical tensions in the years'00, and the aggravation of an economic crisis when landlocked, have cooled the enthusiasm to the east for the Union. Just as the euroccidentali counterparts, expressing widespread skepticism toward the EU policies and show the same indifference to the elections dell'europarlamento of who is in the Community for 50 years. There is still everything to create a Europeanism "bottom". Derrida and Habermas believed to see in the millions to the streets for peace on February 15 2003, the birth of a European demos. So it was not. And never will be?

Inside Networked Movements: Interview with Jeffrey Juris

Inside Networked Movements
Interview with Jeffrey Juris
By Geert Lovink

Jeffrey Juris wrote an excellent insiders? story about the ?other
globalization? movement. Networking Futures is an anthropological
account that starts with the Seattle protests, late 1999, against the
WTO and takes the reader to places of protest such as Prague,
Barcelona and Genoa. The main thesis of Juris is the shift of radical
movements towards the network method as their main form of
organization. Juris doesn?t go so far to state that movement as such
has been replaced by network(ing). What the network metaphor rather
indicates is a shift, away from the centralized party and a renewed
emphasis on internationalism. Juris describes networks as an ?emerging
ideal.? Besides precise descriptions of Barcelona groups, where Jeff
Juris did his PhD research with Manuel Castells in 2001-2002, the
World Social Forum and Indymedia, Networking Futures particularly
looks into a relatively unknown anti-capitalist network, the People?s
Global Action. The outcome is a very readable book, filled with group
observations and event descriptions, not heavy on theory or strategic
discussions or disputes. The email interview below was done while
Jeffrey Juris was working in Mexico City where studies the
relationship between grassroots media activism and autonomy. He is an
Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the Department of Social and
Behavioral Sciences at Arizona State University.

GL: One way of describing your book is to see it as a case study of
Peoples' Global Action. Would it be fair to see this networked
platform as a 21st century expression of an anarcho-trotskyist avant-
gardist organization? You seem to struggle with the fact that PGA is
so influential, yet unknown. You write about the history of the World
Social Forum and its regional variations, but PGA is really what
concerns you. Can you explain to us something about your fascination
with PGA? Is this what Ned Rossiter calls a networked organization? Do
movements these days need such entities in the background?

JJ: I wouldn?t call my book a case study of People?s Global Action
(PGA) in a strict sense, but you are right to point to my fascination
with this particular network. In many ways I started out wanting to do
an ethnographic study of PGA, but as I suggest in my introduction, its
highly fluid, shifting dynamics made a conventional case study
impossible. A case study requires a relatively fixed object of
analysis. With respect to social movement networks this would imply
stable nodes of participation, clear membership structures,
organizational representation, etc., all of which are absent from PGA.
However, this initial methodological conundrum presented two
opportunities. On the one hand, it seemed to me that PGA was not
unique, but reflected broader dynamics of transnational political
activism in an era characterized by new digital technologies, emerging
network forms, and the political visions that go along with such
transformations. In this sense, PGA was on the cutting edge; it
provided a unique opportunity to explore not only the dynamics, but
also the strengths and weaknesses of new forms of networked
organization among contemporary social movements.

At the same time, PGA also represented a kind of puzzle: I knew it had
been at the center of the global days of action that people generally
associate with the rise of the global justice movement, yet it was
extremely hard to pin down. Participating individuals, collectives,
and organizations seemed to come and go, and those who were most
active in the process often resolutely denied that they were members
or had any official role. Yet, the PGA network still had this kind of
power of evocation, and, at least during the early years of my
research (say 1999 to 2002), it continued to provide formal and
informal spaces of interaction and convergence. In this sense, it
seemed to me that figuring out the enigma of PGA could help us better
understand the logic of contemporary networked movements more
generally. On the other hand, the difficulty of carrying out a
traditional ethnographic study of PGA meant I had to shift my focus
from PGA as a stable network to the specific practices through which
the PGA process is constituted. In other words, my initial
methodological dilemma opened up my field of analysis to a whole set
of networking practices and politics that were particularly visible
within PGA, but could also be detected to varying degrees within more
localized networks, such as the Movement for Global Resistance (MRG)
in Barcelona, alternative transnational networks such as the World
Social Forum (WSF) process, new forms of tactical and alternative
media associated with the global justice movement, and within the
organization of mass direct actions.

In other words, the focus of my book is really these broader
networking practices and logics, although these were particularly
visible within the PGA process. Methodologically, then, I situated
myself within a specific movement node?MRG in Barcelona, and followed
the network connections outward through various network formations,
including but not restricted to PGA. However, it is also true that the
ethnographic stories I present are largely told from the vantage point
of activists associated with PGA. This is because MRG happened to be a
co-convener of the PGA network during the time of my research, but
also because PGA activists were particularly committed to what I refer
to as a network ideal.

In my book I distinguish between two ideal organizational logics: a
vertical command logic and a horizontal networking logic, both of
which are present to varying degrees, and exist in dynamic tension
with respect to one another, within any particular network. Whereas
vertical command logics are perhaps more visible within the social
forums, PGA reflects a particular commitment to new forms of open,
collaborative, and directly democratic organization, thus coming
closer to the horizontal networking logics I am most concerned with.
In this sense, PGA is definitively NOT a 21st century avant-gardist
organization and has been particularly hostile to traditional top-down
Marxist/Trotskyist political models and visions. PGA does reflect
something an anarchist ethic, although this has more to do with the
confluence between networking logics and anarchist organizing
principles than any kind of abstract commitment to anarchist politics
per se.

Rather than a networked organization, which refers to the way
traditional organizations increasingly take on the network form, PGA
is closer to an ?organized network? in Ned Rossiter?s terms, a new
institutional form that is immanent to the logic of the new media
(although in this case not restricted to the new media). The network
structure of PGA thus provides a transnational space for communication
and coordination among activists and collectives. For example, PGA?s
hallmarks reflect a commitment to decentralized forms of organization,
while the network has no members and no one can speak in its name.
Rather than a traditional organization (however networked) with clear
membership and vertical chains of command, PGA provides the kind of
communicational infrastructure necessary for the rise of contemporary
networked social movements. The challenge for PGA and similar
networks, given their radical commitment to a horizontal networking
logic, has always been sustainability. This is where the social
forums, with their greater openness to vertical forms, have been more
effective. In this sense, I find PGA much more exciting and
politically innovative, but it may be the hybrid institutional forms
represented by the social forums that have a more lasting impact.

GL: We're 3 or 4 years further now. What has changed since you
undertook your research? The post 9-11 effect has somewhat leveled
off, I guess, but the anti-war movement is also weaker. Is it fair to
say that the worldwide ?Seattle movement' has weakened, or rather,
exhausted itself? Please update us.

JJ: If you mean the visible expressions of movement activity,
particularly those associated with confrontational direct actions,
then I think it is fair to say the worldwide anti-corporate
globalization/anti-capitalist/global justice movement has weakened.
But it is not entirely exhausted. As I argue in my book, mass
mobilizations are critical tools for generating the visibility and
affective solidarity (e.g. emotional energy) required for sustained
networking and movement building. However, activists eventually tire
and public interest inevitably wanes. In this sense, movements are
cyclical and the public moments of visibility necessarily ebb and
flow. In terms of the global justice movement, events such as 9-11, or
the repression in Genoa, certainly put a damper on the movement, but
it would have slowed anyway. That said, mass actions have continued
throughout the post- 9-11 period, while the anti-war and global
justice movements have largely converged, although more so outside the
United States. What we have seen is a shift toward the increasing
institutionalization of movement activity combined with a return to
?submerged? networking, to borrow a term from Melucci.

If we think about social movements in terms of these less visible,
spectacular forms of action, then in many ways, the global justice
movement has proven remarkably sustainable. In this sense, global
justice activists have continued to organize mass actions, but at
regularized intervals (every two years against the G8 Summit, for
example, or every four years during the Democratic and Republic
National Conventions in the U.S.). The massive 2007 anti-G8
mobilization in Heiligendamm, Germany, which I was able to attend, was
a particularly empowering experience for many younger activists. At
the same time, the global social forum process has continued to
provide a more institutionalized arena for networking and interaction.
Although the WSF itself has attracted declining media coverage, tens
of thousands people continue to attend the periodic centralized global
events (every two years or so), while local and regional forums have
expanded in many parts of the world.

For example, the first U.S. Social Forum was held in Atlanta last
summer, representing a key moment of convergence for a movement that
was particularly weakened by the climate of fear and repression after
9-11. At the same time, countless networks, collectives, and projects
that arose in the context of the global justice movement continue to
operate outside public view, including local organizing projects and
new media-related initiatives such as Indymedia. In sum, if we think
about movements as those relatively rare periods of increasingly
visible and confrontational direct action, then the global justice
movement has perhaps run its course, at least for now. However, if we
take into account the submerged, localized, routinized, and
increasingly institutionalized (by which I mean the building of new
movement institutions, not the existing representative democratic
ones), then the movement remains alive and well, perhaps surprisingly
vibrant after so many years.

GL: We can't say that many practice "militant ethnography". There is a
limited interest in media activism but the life inside radical
movements is not over studied. In the past decade this was, in part,
also due to rampant anti-intellectualism. What is the intellectual
life inside social movements like these days? What are the main
debates and critical concepts?

JJ: The lack of ?militant? ethnographic approaches to life inside
radical social movements has to be understood not only with respect to
anti-intellectualism among activists, which varies from region to
region, but also the dominant academic traditions for studying social
movements. For the most part, what many refer to as ?social movement
theory? has been the province of sociologists and political
scientists, many of whom are committed to positivist theory building,
using quantitative or qualitative methods, and thus tend to view
social movements as ?objects? to be studied from the outside. These
scholars may support the political goals of the movements they study,
but their theory and methods are directed toward other academics, not
movements themselves. There has always been a significant counter-
tradition, of course, including anthropologists who have used
ethnographic methods to study popular movements around the world and a
few politically engaged scholars who have gone deep inside the heart
of radical movements, such as Barbara Epstein?s study of the U.S.
direct action movement during the 1970s and 1980s, ?Political Protest
and Cultural Revolution,? or George Katsiaficas? book on German
autonomous movements, ?The Subversion of Politics.?

Meanwhile, critiques of positivist approaches to social movements have
become more frequent within the academy, while the recent push for a
more public or activist anthropology and sociology have led to a more
conducive environment for ?militant? approaches to the study of social
movements. At the same time, there has also been a noticeable trend
toward self-analysis and critique among activists themselves. In my
book I suggest that contemporary social movements are increasingly
?self-reflexive,? as evidenced by the countless networks of knowledge
production, debate, and exchange among global justice activists,
including listserves, Internet forums, radical theory groups, activist
research networks, etc. There is still a great deal of anti
intellectualism, although as mentioned above, this varies by region.
For example, in my experience, activists in the Anglo-speaking world,
including the UK and the U.S., tend to be more suspicious of
intellectuals, while those in Southern Europe or the Southern Cone of
Latin America are more open to abstract theorizing.

There has been a general surge in activist research and radical theory
projects linked to the global justice movement over the past decade,
many of which have been associated with the social forum process. In
this sense, there has been a blurring of the divide between academic
and movement-based theorizing as evidenced not only in my own work,
but in many other spheres, including the volume edited by Stephven
Shukaitis and David Graeber, ?Constituent Imagination,? the on-line
journal Ephemera, or the newly created movement newspaper Turbulence.
In terms of the main debates and critical concepts these vary widely
depending on the particular network, region, or project. Given that we
are dealing with a ?movement of movements? or a ?network or networks?
the particular issues and ideas of concern to activists are shaped by
the specific contexts in which they are embedded. My own work is no
exception, as I was particularly influenced by the interest in
networks, digital technologies, and new forms of organization among
activists in Barcelona. It was through hours of collaborative
practice, discussion, and debate that I began to see the network as
not only a technical artifact and organizational form, but also a
widespread political ideal.

It was fascinating to see how the concept of the network popularized
by theorists such as Manuel Castells or Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri
had seeped into activist discourse itself. Indeed, by the end of my
time in the field the ?network? had emerged as one of the key unifying
concepts among global justice activists around the world, and many of
the movement debates surrounded the pros and cons of network
organizing, the divide between the so called ?horizontals? and
?verticals,? the struggle against informal hierarchies, the role of
new technologies, etc. In other words, the theoretical concerns
addressed in my book reflect the concepts and debates I encountered in
the movement itself. At the same time, the specific theoretical
languages and traditions through which these issues have been
addressed vary greatly. For example, many Italian activists associated
with the occupied social centers, and those influenced by them
elsewhere, were particularly influenced by the Italian autonomists and
concepts such as the multitude, immaterial labor, and precarity found
in the writing of Hardt & Negri and Paolo Virno, among others. Some of
the more UK-based radical theory networks have been particularly
influenced by Gilles Deleuze as well as Deleuze and Guattari?s notion
of the rhizome.

Although some movement pockets in Barcelona were in line with the
Italian tradition, many of the Catalan activists I worked with were
more familiar with Manuel Castells, and there was a general concern
for emerging forms of participatory democracy. To the extent that
there have been intellectual debates within the U.S. context, these
have tended to revolve around direct democracy, on the one hand, and
issues of race, class, and exclusion, on the other. The other critical
arena for intellectual discussion and debate within the global justice
movement has revolved around the social forum process. Here the key
concept has been ?open space,? which I view as a reflection of a
horizontal networking logic inscribed within the organizational
architecture of the forum. Proponents of open space see the forum as a
new kind of organization, an arena for dialogue and exchange rather
than a unified political actor. Critics argue the open space concept
neglects the multiple exclusions generated by any political space, and
undermines the ability of the movement to engage in the kind of
coordinated actions needed to achieve tangible victories. The open
space debate thus incorporates many of the concepts and tensions that
are important within the movement, including networks, the rise of a
new politics, participatory democracy, and tension between networking
and vertical command logics.

Finally, activists have also widely debated alternative models of
social change, particularly within and around the forums. Although
traditional sectors of the movement are still committed to state-
centered strategies of reform or revolution, there has been a keen
interest, particularly among younger and more radical activists, in
more autonomous forms of transformation based on ?changing the world
without taking power? to borrow a phrase from John Holloway. These
emerging political visions involve a complex mix of traditional
anarchism, autonomous Marxism, Deleuzian post-structuralism, and the
post-representational logic of organized networks. The intellectual
life within many (though not all) parts of the movement continues to
thrive, and in many respects represents a far richer and more complex
set of ideas and debates than those found within many academic circles.

GL: It is not hard to notice that you left the Italian intellectual
influences outside of your writings. One could easily state that the
bible of Seattle movement has been Negri/Hardt's Empire (with Spinoza
hovering in the background). No traces of Virno or Berardi either, no
Lazzarato, not even an Pasquinelli or Terranova. How come?

JJ: I do address Hardt & Negri?s work, but not so much the others.
This is perhaps more of a reflection of my particular approach to
theory, as well as my anthropological concern for ?staying close to
practices,? as Chris Kelty puts it in his recent book on free
software, ?Two Bits,? than a statement of my affinity (or lack
thereof) for Italian theory. Analytically, I take the emergence of
distributed networks associated with post-fordist, informational
capitalism (as analyzed by Hardt & Negri, Castells, and others) as a
starting point, but I specifically examine how network forms are
generated in practice and how they relate to network technologies and
imaginaries. I use ethnography to generate another series of concepts
that are closer to the networking practices I encountered in the
field, such as the cultural logic and politics of networking. In this
sense, I try to descend from the realm of abstract theorizing about
networks, immaterial labor, capitalism, and so forth, to consider the
complex micro-political struggles and practices through which concrete
network norms and forms are generated in specific contexts, as well as
the links between network norms, forms, and technologies more
generally. Hardt & Negri are thus in the background, particularly
their emphasis on the networked form of contemporary resistance, but I
am concerned with a more concrete level.

At the same time, it is true that I am less convinced by the more
ontological, Spinozan dimension of Hardt & Negri?s writing, given my
emphasis on practices, circulations, and connections- the rise of new
political subjectivities certainly, but I?m not so sure about a new
historical subject. A second, more contextual reason why the Italian
theorists are not more prominent in my book has to do with the fact
that the particular Catalan activists I worked with most closely were
less influenced by this tradition than theorists such as Manuel
Castells, general writing on participatory democracy, or ideas
developed through their own grounded networking practices. In this
sense, although Empire has indeed been influential within many global
justice movement circles, and has had an important impact on my own
thinking and writing; it would be a stretch to call it, or any other
single book for that matter, the bible of the global justice movement.
The movement is too diverse and there are too many political and
regional variations. Finally, to be frank, I was not aware of Berardi,
Lazzarato, Pasquinelli, or Terranova at the time of writing this book,
which is partly due to the specific intellectual and political
currents in which I moved. It would be interesting to go back and
address some of these theorists now, particularly Terranova?s ?Network
Culture,? and Ned Rossiter?s recent book, ?Organized Networks,? which
more deeply engages the Italian tradition.

GL: Do you see the networking practices amongst radical activists as
something special? I mean, isn't it terribly mainstream to use all
these technologies? I understand that the network paradigm within the
realm of politics is still something new, but as tools there is
nothing that creative, or even subversive, about their cultures of use.

JJ: My contention is not that the networking practices I explore in my
book are unique to radical activists, but they do form part of an
innovative mode of radical political practice that has to be
understood in the context of an increasing confluence between network
norms, forms, and technologies. It is important to point out that,
when I talk about networking practices, I am not only referring to the
use of digital technologies, but also to new forms of organizational
practice. Activist networking practices are both physical and virtual,
and they are frequently associated with emerging political
imaginaries. It is precisely the interaction between network
technologies, network-based organizational forms, and network-based
political norms that characterizes radical activism.

As I point out in Networking Futures, there is nothing particularly
liberatory or progressive about networks. As Castells and Hardt &
Negri show, decentralized networks are characteristic of post-fordist
modes of capital accumulation generally, while terror, crime,
military, and police outfits increasingly operate as transnational
networks as well (see Luis Fernandez? fantastic new book about police
networks, ?Policing Dissent?). What is unique about radical activist
networking, however, is not only how such practices are used in the
context of mass movements for social, economic, and environmental
justice, but also the way radical activists project their egalitarian
values- flat hierarchies, horizontal relations, and decentralized
coordination, etc.- back onto network technologies and forms
themselves. It is this contingent confluence that makes certain
activist networking practices radical, not the use of specific kinds
of technologies per se.

GL: One could easily write a separate study of Indymedia and the
Independent Media Centres, which were erected during all these protest
events. You have not gone very deeply into internal Indymedia matters.
These days, almost ten years later, Indymedia is not playing an active
role anymore, at least not the international English edition. How did
it lose its momentum and is there still a need for such news-driven
sites?

JJ: Although I do address Indymedia and other forms of collaborative
digital networking, it?s true that the main ethnographic focus of my
book revolves around broader global justice networks such as MRG in
Barcelona or PGA and the WSF process on a transnational scale. Largely
for that reason I was not able to provide more in-depth coverage of
the fascinating and very important internal debates and dynamics
within the Indymedia network. Tish Stringer?s dissertation on the
Houston Indymedia collective called, ?Move! Guerrilla Media,
Collaborative Modes, and the Tactics of Radical Media Making,? comes
closest to this kind of analysis. I?m not sure what you mean when you
say that Indymedia is not playing an active role anymore. If you mean
that the novelty of the network has worn off, that particular
collectives are not as active as they once were, or that it is no
longer on the cutting edge of technological and/or organizational
innovation, you may be right. But if you mean that Indymedia has a
lower profile on the web than it used to or that activists no longer
read or contribute to the various local and international sites, then
I?m not so sure. Indymedia is nearly ten years old and certainly much
of its novelty has worn off. At the same time, it continues to fulfill
a key role of providing a space for activists to generate and
circulate their own news and information, facilitating mobilization
and continuing to challenge the divide between author and consumer.
There have been heated debates within the network about the need to
generate more reliable and higher quality posts, and I think this goal
still remains elusive. In this sense, Indymedia remains very good at
doing what it was initially set up to do, but it has not advanced much
further in terms of pushing the bounds of its grassroots collaborative
production process to generate the kind of deeper and more insightful
reporting that some might wish for.

For example, there had been a proposal to develop a kind of open
editing system that would generate more accurate, higher quality posts
without the need for a more centralized editorial process, but that
proposal has yet to yield any concrete results, as far as I know. If
this is what you mean by losing momentum, then I suppose it is true.
However, this might be expecting too much. In my experience networks
are often good at achieving the specific goals they were established
for, but efforts to reprogram them midstream are often extremely
difficult. It is generally much easier to simply create a new project
or network than try to retool an existing one. In this sense, I would
expect that further innovation with respect to alternative,
decentralized news production is happening elsewhere. Indymedia thus
continues to play a critical role for grassroots activists in many
parts of the world, and, in fact, I think it is one of the most
important and enduring institutions the global justice movement has
left behind. At the same time, I think the desire to see Indymedia
become something else, resolve all of its internal tensions, or
forever remain at the vanguard of innovation is misplaced. Indymedia
will continue to fulfill a key role in terms of creating alternative,
self-produced activist news and information, but I think it is
important to look elsewhere for new innovations, practices, and
strategies.

In my own case, I have recently become fascinated with the burgeoning
free media scene in Mexico, which includes not only online news sites,
but also a rapidly expanding network of Internet/FM radio stations,
web-based forums and zines, digital video collectives, free software
initiatives, etc. (my current research focuses on the relationship
between alternative media, autonomy, and repression in Mexico). Some
of the most exciting developments are happening within the free
radios, many of which combine FM and Internet broadcasts to reach out
to activists on a global scale, while at the same time more deeply
engaging local populations outside typical activist circles. Many of
these projects combine an open publishing component on the web with
live streaming as well as more focused and directed reporting about
local issues and wider national and international campaigns.

GL: Your research clearly shows that there is a direct and positive
relation between autonomous social movement and network paradigms.
However, on the Internet level this is no longer the case as of about
five years ago or so. Activists worldwide have lost touch with the
whole Web 2.0 wave and they tend to have neither a positive nor a
critical attitude toward social networking applications, for example.
There does seem to be a productive engagement with free software and
perhaps wikis, but not even blogs have been appropriated. How come?

JJ: As I understand the question, you seem to be suggesting that the
Internet has progressed over the past few years, but that activists
from autonomous-oriented movements are not keeping up. They were once
at the forefront of technological innovation, but this is no longer
the case. Perhaps, but I?m not sure this is the most productive
framework for looking at this, although the more specific question of
why or why not certain groups of activists appropriate particular
Internet tools is a fascinating one. This is a big question, though,
and is also somewhat counter-factual. I can offer a few speculative
thoughts based on my research and activist experience, but I suppose
the best way to get at this would be to simply ask people why they do
or do not use certain web tools. In general, though, if the argument
in my book is right that contemporary activism involves an increasing
confluence between network norms, forms, and technologies, I would
expect that activists would be more likely to use those Internet tools
that most closely reflect their political values and most effectively
enhance their preferred forms of organization. In this sense, Internet
listserves and collaborative on-line forums such as Indymedia
facilitate decentralized movement organization and reflect values
related to bottom-up organization, grassroots coordination, direct
democracy, and the like. These sorts of early Internet tools
facilitated movement organization and reflected the values of the
movement.

The question is whether more recent Internet tools, including social
networking and video sharing sites, blogs, and/or wikis also enhance
mobilization and reflect activists? values. If they don?t, I wouldn?t
expect activists to appropriate them, and thus would not be worried if
activists are somehow not keeping up. In terms of free software and
wikis, I think this is one area where, as you rightly point out,
radical or autonomous-oriented activists have been deeply engaged.
Both free software and wikis precisely reflect the kind of
collaborative networking ethic that I explore in my book, and it
should come as no surprise that so many radical or autonomous
activists see their own struggles reflected in the struggle for free
software or that so many contemporary activist collectives and
projects use wikis- and the decentralized, collaborative editing
process these tools allow. In my view, social networking sites are
completely different. While non-governmental organizations, policy
reform initiatives (such as those lil? green mask requests to stop
global warming on Facebook), political campaigns (look how many
friends Obama has!) have arguably begun to make effective use of sites
such as Facebook or MySpace, in my experience this has been less true
of more radical movements. My book does have a MySpace site, which is
linked to other books, projects, and organizations, and I do belong to
an anarchist group on Facebook, but I don?t find much ongoing
interaction and coordination on these sites.

Many radicals I know use social networking sites in much the same way
as other individuals do- to keep up with their friends and maintain
interpersonal communication, but (and I might be behind the ball
here), they are not as frequently used for collaborative kinds of
organizing. It seems to me that not only are social networking sites
extremely corporate, they don?t necessarily facilitate the kind of
collaborative, directly democratic forms of organization and
coordination that tools such as wikis or old-school listserves do.
They do a good job of allowing radicals to keep in touch with their
friends and broadcast what they are up to, but I don?t think they
facilitate networked forms of organization or particularly reflect
directly democratic ideals. I would say the same for blogs, which,
with perhaps a few exceptions, are generally a personalized, broadcast
medium, and thus not necessarily conducive to more collective,
distributed norms and forms of organization. On the contrary, I would
say video sharing sites such as YouTube (and similar non-commercial
endeavors), do enhance decentralized, networked organization and do
reflect radical activist values by facilitating the autonomous
production and circulation of movement-related images, videos, and
documentaries. Consequently, I have found, in my experience, that
radical activists have made significant use of video sharing sites.
The videos posted on YouTube from the No Borders camp last November in
Mexicali/Calexico provide one concrete example. Rather than asking
whether activists are keeping up with the latest Internet trends, a
more useful question is perhaps whether the latest Internet tools
facilitate distributed forms of networked organization and whether
they reflect activists? political ideals. To the extent they do, I
would expect activists to enthusiastically take them up. To the extent
they don?t, I would expect there to be limited interest beyond the
individual level.

GL: The 'distributed' form of organization could also be read as just
another expression of more individualism, and less commitment. There
is a debate right now about 'organized networks' and how organization
can be strengthened in the age of networks. Do you think this is
possible or should we drop the 'network' in the first place?

JJ: I would say the distributed network form of organization reflects
a particular strategy for balancing individual and collective needs,
interests, and desires. Rather than less commitment, it reflects a
broader shift toward what the Sociologist Paul Lichterman, in his book
?The Search for Political Commitment,? calls ?personalized
commitment.? That said, it is true that diffuse, flexible activist
networks have generally proven more effective at organizing short-term
mobilizations and events than the kind of sustainable organizations
needed to generate lasting social transformation. There is often a
false debate between ?movement? or ?flexible networks? and
?institutionalization,? as if there were only one way to
institutionalize. Institutions are generally associated with the kind
of centralized, top-down bureaucratic organizations inherited from the
industrial age. However, if we see institutions more broadly as simply
sustainable networks of social relations along with the organizational
and technological infrastructure that makes such relations possible
then there are many ways to institutionalize. In this sense, there is
no necessary contradiction between sustainable organization and
networks.

The key is to create new kinds of sustainable institutions that
reflect and incorporate the networking logics I explore in my book.
For example, what would a political institution look like that is
sustainable over time and able to generate more effective coordinated
action, yet is still based on directly democratic forms of decision-
making, bottom-up participation, decentralized collaboration, etc.? As
I understand it this is the crux of what you, Ned Rossiter and others
are talking about when you argue for the need to move toward organized
networks, at least in the realm of new media. I agree that something
similar is needed in the realm of political activism. I think there
will always be a role for more flexible, diffuse networks to plan and
coordinate specific actions. And there is nothing wrong with letting
these networks fizzle out when they are no longer needed (in my
experience old networks rarely die, they simply cease to provide a
forum for active communication). However, I do think it is important
that we build new kinds of networked institutions (contra
institutional networks) that reflect the best of what distributed
networks have to offer, but are more sustainable over time. At
present, I think the social forums, with all their problems, are the
best example we have of this new kind of organized network in the
realm of political action.

Forums are hybrid organizations, combining vertical and horizontal
organizing logics. Many radicals have criticized the social forums
precisely because of the participation and influence of traditional
reformist institutional actors. However, in my view, it is precisely
at the intersection of these different sorts of political and
organizational logics, and in the context of the associated conflicts
and debates, that new kinds of sustainable hybrid networked
institutions will emerge. This is why I have consistently argued over
the years that more radical activists should engage the forum, even if
from the margins, creating autonomous spaces to interact with the
forum process while promoting their more innovative horizontal
networking practices. Again, it is through this kind of ongoing
interaction and conflict between different organizational logics and
practices that new kinds of organized networks will emerge in the
political realm. It is no accident that of all the projects, networks,
and institutions that have been created by the global justice movement
the social forums remain the most active and vibrant, despite, or
perhaps precisely because of, the continued critiques. To go back to
your first question, PGA remains closest to my heart, but the social
forums may ultimately turn out to be a more lasting and influential
organized network. One of the more interesting projects I have taken
part in over the past few years, the Networked Politics initiative
(http://www.networked-politics.info/ ), has been an effort on the part of
activists and engaged scholars to think more deeply about how to develop
new forms of politics and institutions that are sustainable yet reflect the
kinds of networking logics and practices that were particularly visible in
the context of the global justice movement.

GL: You got involved at the right time, and got out to write down your
findings at the moment when the 'other globalization movement' had
somehow lost steam. Do you agree? There is a certain nostalgia for Big
Event days, which makes Networking Futures such a fascinating read.
Where do you see the movements heading? We can all see that they are
not dead, but the urge to continue as if it still were 2001-2002 isn't
there anymore. Is the network form making it more bearable to see
movements disappear? You seem to have no problem admitting that
"social movements are cyclical phenomena." What topics and social
formation do you see emerging? Would it, for instance, make sense to
come up with a radical movement inside the larger context of climate
change?

JJ: Yes, I think that?s right. I was extremely fortunate to have
gotten involved in the movement when it was becoming publicly visible
in Seattle, and then lived through what we might call its peak years
from a unique position in Barcelona. I think the movement lost some
steam, or at least some of its confrontational spirit, after the
repression in Genoa, and then 9-11 obviously had a huge impact,
although more so in the United States then elsewhere. Somewhere
between 2002 and 2003 I think the social forums began to replace mass
actions as the main focus of the movement, which reflected a shift, in
my view, toward a more sustainable form of movement activity. At the
same time, there was also a move toward more local forms of organizing
rooted in specific communities. To some extent I think the turn away
from mass actions and the change in emphasis toward local organizing
resulted from the critique of summit hopping that had been around
since Seattle (if not before) but became increasingly widespread as
the novelty of mass actions began to wear off. At the same time,
regardless of any internal movement debates, it is increasingly
difficult to pull off successful mass direct actions over time.

The sociologist Randal Collins hypothesizes that movements can only
maintain their peak levels for about two years, which isn?t too far
off in the case of the global justice movement (say late 1999 to
mid-2001 or so). In this sense, the shift of emphasis toward the
forums and local organizing, although not necessarily conceived in
this way, was a strategic response to the cyclical nature of social
movements. Mass actions continue of course, but as I pointed out
above, even these have become more regularized and routine. The
movement has thus traded some of its emotional intensity for greater
sustainability. Given this strategic shift, I would say the movement
remains surprisingly vibrant. In contrast, as Barbara Epstein has
argued, the anti-nuclear energy movement petered out when activists
failed to make the shift from mass actions, which began attracting
fewer and fewer people and eliciting decreasing media attention, to an
alternative strategy. In many ways, the global justice movement is
well placed to pick up steam again if and when the next cycle of
increasing confrontation comes around again.

The global justice/alternative globalization/anti-capitalist frame is
a good one in that it encompasses an array of movements and struggles,
while maintaining a focus on systemic interconnections. I think it
would be an error to revert back to single issue politics and
struggles at this point, as such connections would be obscured and the
social, political, and cultural capital of the global justice movement
would be squandered. In this sense, rather than organize a radical
movement around climate change, for example, it would make more sense
to organize around this issue in the context of a global justice
frame. This was done to great effect by the European anti-war
movement, which was a really a fusion between the anti-war and global
justice movements. This connection was never really made in the U.S.,
partly due to the absence of a national level forum process, and both
movements were worse off as a result. In terms of what specific issues
I see emerging, that is always a tough call, but I think you are right
that global climate change will constitute a key site of struggle over
the next few years, as will alternative energy, particularly given the
spike in oil prices. At the same time, in light of the current global
financial and economic crisis, a broad anti-capitalist critique
remains as relevant and important as ever. Moreover, if the history of
previous crises provides any indication, we may well see the rise of a
global democracy movement to challenge the increasing repression and
authoritarian trends in many parts of the world. Whatever new forms of
struggle emerge, I think they will be stronger to the extent that they
can link themselves to a broader anti-systemic critique such as that
represented by the global justice movement.

--

Jeffrey S. Juris, Networking Futures, The Movements Against Corporate
Globalization, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2008.

Promotional website of the book: http://networkingfutures.com/home.html.

ASU page of Jeffrey Juris: https://sec.was.asu.edu/directory/person/863914
.

You loved the crash

NOW GET READY FOR THE RECESSION!

There are only a few serious things to say about what's happened in the
economy for over the last four weeks, or the last four years for that
matter. The first is that despite the admiration being showered on
Paulson, Bernanke and Gordon Brown, what we are witnessing are financial
crimes, leading to disastrous consequences for nations, institutions and
probably hundreds of millions of people. Second, the criminals have
their main offices on Wall Street, in the City of London and in
Washington, plus on every derivatives trading floor in banks all over
the earth -- and there they should be prosecuted, not in a witch hunt
but in order to find out exactly how they did it, to strip them of their
most egregious spoils (plenty of that out there) and above all, to make
the whole thing impossible in the future. Third, if the national
bailouts are not transformed into social works projects producing
valuable goods and services employing people who need it, and if serious
financial-market regulation is not installed at the same time, then what
will come of this whole mess is just a reinforcement of the present
condition: government by greed, carried out in the coded language of
mathematics.

The bankruptcy of this transnational financial government is now
literal, but in terms of human development it has been that way all
along. The only good news about the recession is that it will be a
tangible reason to press for far-reaching changes in the system! The
worst news will hit the most unprotected people, and often the furthest
away from any of the easy money, which is why we are really talking
about crimes, deep failures of responsibility on the part of governments
as well as businessmen. I am thinking about the impacts on Latin
America, on Eastern Europe, on Africa, on any small country without some
juicy resource to put on the market.

It's too early to say anything specific about the geopolitical
consequences of the meltdown, but what I find most remarkable about this
recent turbulence is first that it has basically been a familiar case of
"hot money" following into countries from a powerful outside source of
liquidity. This time, however, the target countries have been the US and
Britain, plus the other Anglo-Saxon lands and to a lesser degree,
European countries like Spain. It's true that Greenspan pumped up this
excess liquidity with ridiculously cheap interest rates, especially
after the dotcom bust and September 11, but since the turn of the
millennium that excess money supply has been massively augmented by
influxes of capital from east Asia, mostly China. This hot money was
looking for investments over and above the usual Treasury bonds, and
what it found was not only the government-backed Fannie and Freddy
mortgages, but also all kinds of other packaged debt rated triple-A and
further insured with credit-default swaps. So more and more loans were
packed into CDOs and the money poured in to buy them, ironically just as
it had poured into into the Asian dragons or Russia and the newly
independent Eastern countries in the mid-1990s. This time, however, what
you got was not capital flight but the systemic collapse of the shadow
banking system that was trading all that junk, a collapse which is still
going on via the unfinished process of deleveraging. That means that all
the borrowed money used to pump up the paper values, often at 30 times
the value of the actual stake put up by the speculators, now has to be
either paid back or written off, with collapses and bailouts all along
the daisy-chain. If the first massive bailouts were reserved for the US
government-backed mortgage companies and for AIG's big credit-default
insurance operation (located in the City), that's because the Chinese
financial pipeline could not just be callously ruptured without
disastrous consequences on the international capital circuit. Still, the
potentially positive result of all this is that foreign investors have
been seriously burned by the Anglo-American derivatives machine, and now
the London-New York tandem may now effectively lose its directive
position in the world economy.

A detail you may not have noticed is that directly in the middle of the
turbulence, Chinese authorities made a decision to give peasants the
rights to transfer the title of the land they occupy in exchange for
money. It's not exactly a sale, because the government still formally
owns the land, but it does mean that the peasants' rights become liquid,
they can be turned into cash. The significance of this is that China now
sees the futility of continuing to produce for the West and then invest
its profits there, in order to keep its currency value low and keep the
lid on inflation. That circuit, known as Bretton Woods II because it
kept the American dollar at the center of the world monetary system, may
now be finished. China is now likely to partially turn its back on the
capital circuit linking it to America and open the floodgates of
internal migration from the countryside to the coastal cities, while at
the same time attempting to develop its internal market far beyond the
existing levels. The idea will be to make China's productive capacity
circulate internally in the form of goods and service, rather than
having exploited Chinese labor produce exports for credit-gorged
consumers in the West. This could be a huge turnabout, setting the pace
for the emergence of a truly sovereign Asian region, with respect to
which the West could just become second-class, period. However, at the
same time you are looking at another vast expansion of the money
economy, full of the usual dangers. Unless it is deeply transformed, the
internal Chinese market will be subject to the same kind of predatory
lending, real-time turbulence and uncertain future as we have just seen,
again and again and again. The existing stock markets there have fallen
by 50% this year (and that was before last week). Even economic history
isn't over yet!

What does it mean that yesterday (13 October), investors and traders
made huge sums on the technical rebound of the stock markets? Is that a
victory? Do we really need this light-speed financial market as a way to
make capital available for productive activities? I read somewhere that
in the US in recent years, for every dollar turned over in the real
economy, you had up to five mathematical dollars biting each other's
tails in the financial sphere. That circulation has given rise to an
elite culture of glitz and also of power, the power to twist the state
governments far from their original mandates (as in Greenspan pumping up
the bubble) and then again, the power to practically control those
states directly in real time, as we have seen in the past weeks where
financial priorities simply took over government, always with the
insistence that something must be done, now, before thinking, in time
for the next stock-market bell. In this respect, finance has become the
mirror of the overriding logic of war, which is the other major enemy of
any kind of democracy. This is the reality: a vast and powerful culture
of finance, a transnational state unto itself, with its own language and
with something like extraterritoriality or diplomatic immunity for its
representatives. Think about the concept of financial crimes. If not,
the crooks will be glad to do all the thinking for you.

best, Brian Holmes

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Class struggle on Wall Street, by Slavoj Zizek

A little more radical than the text Wallerstein:

Class struggle on Wall Street, by Slavoj Zizek

LEMONDE 09.10.08

The first thing that is obvious when looking at responses to the current financial collapse is that ... nobody really knows what to do. This is because the uncertainty is part of the game the way the market will react depends not only on the confidence the players will give government interventions but, more importantly, the degree of confidence they think they can lend to other players: you can not take into account the effect of its interventions.

Sunday, October 12, 2008

System panic days

In times of crisis we all need a little security. For your safety and
pleasure Brian Holmes' speech at the "World Security Days" Vienna.
(A significant contribution to the rather scary debate on artistic
practice...)


Cheers, K

PS: new video on urban peacekeeping and black operations
feat. Brian Holmes, Eva Horn and many others,
http://www.global-security-alliance.com/world-security-days/video


***

"Security Aesthetic = Systems Panic"

This isn't the first time I've participated in the events of the
Global Security Alliance. Previously I spoke under the fictional name
of Frank Beauregard, director of the Paris-based "Risk A" division,
with some slick European ideas on "security aesthetics" for cultural
peacekeeping. The chic aesthetic future of security tried to look
good in the face of an explicit critique of warlike, ineffective
Anglo-American practices used in Iraq and Afghanistan. But what I want
to talk about today, in case anybody missed it, is the implicit angle
of Beauregard's critique, and the target of GSA operations in general.
None other than the deep paranoia and drive toward total paranoid
control that's now being expressed in even the "fuzziest" realms of
security society, namely culture.

Let's approach this whole thing philosophically. Where does security
end, and insecurity begin? Systems analysts recognize this as
a classic boundary question. Its answer determines the precise
deployment of any security system. But as we shall see, this
particular boundary question cannot be answered under present
conditions, except through the definition of a second system, a
specifically interrogatory one. Drawing on the special definition of
an American art critic of the 1960s, I'll call this second kind of
bounded entity an "aesthetic system."

First we should consider how security systems are installed in
reality. Attention is focused on every point where an environment,
conceived as "secure," comes into contact with its outer edges.
Typically, these edges of the system are doors, windows, property
lines, borders, coasts, air-space - every place of ingress or egress.
At each of these edges, a catalogue of known and present dangers is
established. An analysis is conducted to determine the most effective
responses to these dangers; and locks, barriers, fences, warning
devices, surveillance personnel, armed guards, etc. are positioned
at the system's boundaries to repel the threat. Further efforts are
expended to look into the crystal ball of the future, predicting
all those points where new threats could call for the definition of
new boundaries. More material and personnel can then be deployed,
or at least, readied for deployment. The security system expands
dynamically, continually adjusting its relations to the outside world,
continually redefining its own boundaries as a system.

One can easily imagine how a home, an airport or a harbor can
be made "secure." An initial, safe or "quiet" inside space must
simply be preserved from outer harm. But what happens in a complex
social system, one composed of many different actors, some with
irreconcilably diverging interests? In other words, what happens in
an environment where threats can arise from within? The response is
clear: what happens is deep paranoia.

The problem of the system's edges suddenly multiplies: the boundary
to be secured is now the entire volume of the system, its width, its
breadth, its depth, and most damnedly of of all, its human potential
for change in the future. The resulting proliferation of eyes, ears,
cameras, snooping devices, data banks, cross-checks and spiraling
analytical anxiety in the face of every conceivable contingency is
what defines the present security panic. Yet there is a further
complication, which merits our attention, particularly in what is
called a democracy. This is the fact that security measures, in
the face of an internal enemy, come very rapidly to be shrouded in
a veil of secrecy. This is not only to preserve their immediate
effectiveness, though that is, of course, an issue. But secrecy, from
the viewpoint of the security system, is also required to keep the
initial security measures from backfiring and actually increasing
insecurity.

For what if innocent but marginalized social groups knew the extent
to which they are being spied on? Would they not then feel further
alienation, and maybe even defect to the side of the enemy? And what
if mainstream citizens themselves had to be surveilled, for fear that
a violent anomaly might be lurking somewhere in an average profile?
If they knew they were being spied on, wouldn't these honest citizens
become angered, and demand an end to the proliferation of security
measures? Doesn't opinion control then become necessary too? And how
about cultural censorship? Where does security end, and insecurity
begin?

As you can see from the world around us, any security system is
destined under stress to become an entity of uncertain contours, a
veritable black hole in society, extending its cloak of invisibility
to the extent that its internal paranoia deepens; and at the same
time generating an external paranoia about its operations that can
only translate into a redoubling of its initial drive to stealth and
invisibility. Under these conditions, what becomes necessary for the
maintenance of a democracy is a specific kind of social system, whose
probing and questioning can provide some renewed transparency. This is
is where art criticism used to have great ideas.

Writing in 1968, Jack Burnham predicted the coming demise of the
traditional art object, and with it, of the figure of the artist
as Homo faber, or man the maker. In their place would arise the
"aesthetic system" shaped by Homo arbiter formae, man the decider of
forms. The essential reasons were technological and organizational:
in an age of ever-more complex and powerful information machines,
constructed by ever-more sophisticated and extensive organizations, an
art that retained the simple posture of manufacture, or hand-making,
would inevitably be condemned to lose all relevance in the world. Yet
this declining relevance could be countered if the artist rose to
the challenges of the contemporary process of production. As Burnham
wrote:

"The systems approach goes beyond a concern with staged environments
and happenings; it deals in a revolutionary fashion with the larger
problem of boundary concepts... Conceptual focus rather than material
limits define the system. Thus any situation, either in or outside the
context of art, may be designed and judged as a system. In evaluating
systems, the artist is a perspectivist considering goals, boundaries,
structure, input, output, and related activity inside and outside
the system. Where the object almost always has a fixed shape and
boundaries, the consistency of a system may be altered in time and
space, its behavior determined both by external conditions and its
mechanisms of control."

Burnham's ideas were way ahead of his time. In the 1960s, what he
mainly had before his eyes were sculptural environments, or what we
now call installations: relatively simple systems of interaction with
the public, which no longer appeared as art objects, but rather as
heterogeneous assemblages of parts, some of which might break down and
could then be replaced, without in any way damaging the originality
or authenticity of the system. That was already a revolution. What
we've seen emerging in the art of our time, however, particularly
since computerized communications technology became available in
the 1990s, are aestheticized versions of complex socio-technical
systems: networks
of actors, equipment, physical sites and virtual
spaces allowing for the orchestration of quite diverse activities. In
this context of spiraling interactivity, the most important artistic
decisions are the ones that shape the systemic boundary, lending the
system its degrees of recognizability and irrecognizability, and
thus, its potential for symbolic agency. As Burnham remarks, the
systems artist "operates as a quasi-political provocateur, though in
no concrete sense is he an ideologist or a moralist."

How then does a democratic aesthetic come into play, in the face of
a security panic with its inherent tendencies toward invisibility,
concealed intentions, censorship and even aggression? What we have
is the paradoxical, yet also paradigmatic case where one systemic
boundary can only be identified by determining another. What this
means is that an aesthetic system must be constituted as a fully
operational reality, an alliance or network, which can probe the
contours of the secret, dissimulating system, and at the same time,
reveal those hidden outlines mimetically, through its own outer
forms, its own vocabularies and images, its characteristic modes of
appearance and communication. What you get then, in art, are elaborate
fakes, doppelgangers, double agents, fictional entities that strive to
produce outbreaks of truth at their points of contact with the hidden
system. What you get, in other words, are counter-models, the virtual
outlines of rival systems. This is the principle of some of the
most advanced art of today. Jack Burnham understood it in 1968. But
there's just one problem: later generations of critics did not read
him. The job of art and cultural criticism today is to help create
space in democratic societies for the necessary fictions, satires,
double-identities and shadow-boxing of aesthetic systems.


Brian Holmes

Vienna, 2008

a to-do list in times of great recession

dear sisters and brothers,

call it the big slump, the great recession, the new depression: a
major capitalist crisis is among us, and nettime saw it ahead of imf
and goldman economists.

last week's debate seemed to focus on two possible ways to go about
the new historical situation:

i) let's finally secede from the mad and corrupt world of capitalism
and build the new society from scratch, a place were solidarity and
sharing are in and inequality and exploitation (of women, peoples,
nature) are out; let's call it the steampunk solution.
ii) the great recession is a once-in-a-century opportunity to build
radical political and social organizations/federations/coalitions that
can impose redistribution (and thus economic sustainability) and push
for the redesign of basic social structures toward ecological
compatibility; let's call it the commonist solution.

Actually I don't think the two strategies are mutually exclusive. For
instance, a massive increase of public spending that goes toward
financing alternative, sustainable communities, as well as
environmental remediation public works are likely to be progressive
ways out of the recession, while a new postcapitalist culture won't be
able to thrive if there aren't enough spaces and hoods that experiment
with new ways of collective living and explore new dimensions of
social conflict.

Here's an (unorganized) list of statements that I submit to the
discussion; in my wet dreams, it should spring european radicals into
common action now that capitalism is in crisis and neoliberalism has
been finally defeated:

-- we all oppose capitalism here so let's refrain from
cross-excommunications, although postcapitalism is not a goal fixed in
time but a process that evolves according to changing historical
circumstances (i.e. acting in the late 90s is not the same as acting
in late 00s);

-- the eu is engulfed by the great recession and is reverting to
national sovereignties to solve the credit crisis: one more blow at
the already vacillating political legitimacy of council and
commission; but in the present sociopolitical climate a rightist,
authoritarian and xenophobic, even outright fascist outcome is more
likely than a leftist outcome (reformist and/or revolutionary don't
matter here) in europe

-- in fact, the elites are in disarray: they don't know how they sank
into shit so fast and don't know the way out; and even if the free
market suddenly has no longer any appeal for the media or the
population at large, the central bank's rabid monetarism has yet to be
demolished; wages and social spending won't be able to recoup their
due until frankfurt's fundamentalism is defeated in open battle

-- the recession is going to deepen and this will provoke escalating
labor conflict (e.g. belgium's general strike this week, which
paralyzed the whole economy), but the precarious generation must build
its own organization or be left out from the redesign of economic
institutions

-- 2G, as second-generation immigrant youth (first-generation
europeans) are called in italy, will be at the forefront in the social
conflict vis-a-vis securitarian and cryptofascist powers

-- today islamophobia is the functional equivalent of antisemitism in
interwar europe: it's the faultline between right and left in europe;
in recessive conditions, which will fan the flames of xenophobia, only
a transeuropean revolutionary social organization can bridge the gulf
between immigrant and native workers, service and creative labor,
between rebellious 2G youth and dissident white youth

-- politically, it's high time that we build a european federation of
autonomous/anarchist/antiracist/queer metropolitan zones and movements
sharing common symbols, tactics, strategies. A hanseatic league of
social centers, if you will. The circle and the jagged arrow (aka the
Blitz) is probably the most universal symbol of european
insubordination. For all my quest for a new radical iconology, let's
adopt the inherited one as common signature of our struggles:
live it! squat it! fight it! block it!

ciao for now,

lx